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Leveraged Buyouts in the Late Eighties: 
How Bad Were They? 
Abstract 
This study investig~tes the performance of 47 large LBOs that were completed in the 
1987-90 period. We find that these LBOs were not devastated in the 1990-91 recession and 
that banks did not experience large losses in the recession due to HLT lending. In fact, 
cash flow increased by 9.8 percent after adjustment for industry trends in the average 
LBO in our sample. While 28 percent of firms examined in this study experienced 
financial distress, the majority of firms have reissued publicly-held equity, allowing LBO 
investors to cash out. In addition, a number of firms which did experience financial 
distress, experienced subsequent rebounds in operating performance and are now 
successful in their markets. 
1. Introduction 
The 1980s saw the spectacular rise and fall of the leveraged buyout. While leveraged 
buyouts (referred to as LBOs) have been widely criticized for plundering the assets of 
healthy businesses, ·separate studies by Kaplan (1990) and Smith (1991) indicate that 
leveraged buyouts taking place between 1977 and 1986 significantly improved operating 
efficiency. Moreover, LBOs in this period had a relatively small impact on employment, 
research and development and maintenance expenses. This suggests that LBOs were 
good for the companies involved and, most likely, good for the economy as a whole. 
With the dramatic rise in junk bond defaults in 1989-1991, many of which were 
related to unsuccessful LBOs, perceptions of the cohort of LBOs that were completed 
between 1987 and 1990 turned decidedly negative. The later LBOs may have been 
overpriced as potential acquirers outbid each other for the chance to earn fees and a slice 
of buyout profits (Kaplan and Stein (1993)). Or, the best LBOs may have already been 
completed by 1987 and the only remaining targets offered small or nonexistent gains 
from going private. The quality of LBO transactions may have slipped because 
inexperienced buyers entered the market to reap the profits earlier investors had 
reported, but such johnny-come-lately participants lacked the expertise to successfully 
carry out a leveraged buyout. Martin Fridson (1991) argues that agency problems 
between the dealmakers and their investors led to numerous negative net present value 
LBOs in the late 1980s. 
This study documents change in operating performance following 47 of the largest 
leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990. This study extends the earlier work 
of Opler (1992) who analyzed a similar sample. The principal change is the sample now 
focuses on LBOs that took place after 1987 rather than those taking place after 1985. 
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Besides adding later deals, financial performance results through mid-1993 have been 
incorporated in order to document the effects of the 1991-92 recession on LBO 
performance. 
Despite the ,increased rate of financial distress, the evidence presented here 
suggests that leveraged buyouts continued to create value, on balance, throughout the 
late 1980s. Our main findings are: 
e Cash flow I sales rose by 4.2%, from one year before the median sample LBO until 
two years afterwards. After adjustment for industry trends, the median growth 
rate of cash flow to sales was 9.8 percent. 
e Many of the firms in the sample were sufficiently successful to attract new equity 
through initial public offerings or for other public companies to acquire them. 
More than half of the LBOs in the sample return to public ownership within four 
years of being taken private, largely through initial public offerings. The rate of 
reversion to public status compares favorably with the experience of earlier LBOs 
examined by Kaplan (1991 ). 
e Approximately 28 percent of the LBOs in the sample filed for Chapter 11 or 
defaulted on their debt payments by early 1993. While more common than in 
earlier LBOs, financial distress was the exception, not the rule in the LBOs of the 
late 1980s. Moreover, some of the firms that experienced financial distress 
eventually emerged as viable public companies. Thus, default and bankruptcy 
did not necessarily lead to the demise of such LBOs. 
e Concerns of widespread distress among financial institutions that lent to LBOs 
turned out to been overly pessimistic. Banks have charged off relatively few of 
their LBO loans, and the exposure of the largest banks is small in relation to their 
total assets. 
e Research and development spending fell after LBOs of the late 1980s. But 
because so few buyout targets had significant R&D spending, the decline is 
economically insignificant. 
In sum, these findings indicate that LBOs in the 1987-90 period experienced operating 
improvements that were similar to those following earlier deals. While conclusions about 
change in operating performance following LBOs will depend on the sample and the 
performance measures used, our results suggest that LBOs of the late 1980s, like their 
earlier counterparts, produced substantial operating improvements and had a reasonable 
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chance of success. 
The observed operating improvements are also substantially larger than those 
observed in another study of LBOs of the late 1980s undertaken by Long and Ravenscraft 
(1993). Long and Ravenscraft find that the LBOs of 1986 and 1987 actually experienced 
declines in performance. Differences between their results and those obtained here may 
owe to differences in the samples examined. Specifically, they included many smaller 
deals and also used an unusual source of financial data to observe changes in financial 
values after LBOs. 
2. Performance measurement and sample 
2.1 Sample 
This study documents change in operating performance following 47 of the largest 
leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990. All but one of the twenty largest 
LBOs completed during this period are included in the study.1 The sample includes all 
firms that 1) went private in an LBO listed by Forbes in its 1988-1991 "400 Largest Private 
U.S. Firms" and 2) had sufficient public data to measure pre- and post-LBO operating 
performance. Because these large LBOs have the most impact on the economy they are 
naturally of great interest. 
2.2 Definition of operating performance 
The main measure of operating performance used in this study is the operating profit 
margin, as reported in corporate annual reports and COMPUST AT. This is defined as 
1 Montgomery Wards is not examined because pre-buyout financials are unavailable. 
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operating income, or net sales minus cost of goods sold and selling, general and 
administrative expenses (EBITDA), divided by sales. This measures cash flow before 
depreciation, interest and taxes. The benefit of using this cash flow measure is that 
accounting changes. resulting from a leveraged buyout are minimized.2 Using this 
measure may also understate operating improvements insofar as LBOs may improve 
firm's asset utilization measured by the sales/assets ratio. 
3. Changes in performance after LBOs 
3.1 Impact of LBOs on the profit margin 
Table 1 shows the change in operating performance for the 47 LBOs in the sample one 
year and two years after the buyout. The median change in profitability is shown for 
two time frames (year -1 to +1 and year -1 to +2).3 Operating cash flow to sales typically 
rose by 4.2 percent from one year before until two years afterwards. After adjustment 
for industry trends, the median change in operating profit margin was 9.8 percent by the 
second post-LBO year. This indicates that most LBOs of the late 1980s were followed by 
operating improvements relative to other firms in the economy. 
Table 2 shows the individual firms in the sample and the percentage change in 
their profitability from one year before until one year after deal completion. The firms 
are ordered by the year of their LBO and by growth rate within each cohort year. The 
2ln addition, by looking at accounting changes relative to sales instead of assets 
means that the effects of asset write-ups on observed performance are minimized. 
3Results for short horizon time frames (one and two years) also appear to hold over 
longer periods. Profitability grew by four percent among the 19 firms in this study for 
which profitability numbers were available four years after the buyout. This suggests 
that improved profit margins in LBOs are often permanent. 
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results for the individual firms in Table 2 exhibit sizeable variance. Some firms such as 
Joy Technologies and International Controls did very well in the first year after being 
taken private, while others such as Dyncorp, Edgcomb, and 1W A ran into serious 
operating difficulti~. About two-thirds of the companies in Table 2 increased their profit 
margins in the first post-buyout year, and nearly half raised their profit margins by 10 
percent or more. Adjusting for industry performance affects the magnitude of the profits 
considerably but generally does not change the qualitative results-- firms that did poorly 
in an absolute sense tended to do poorly compared to their competitors too. The growth 
rates are fairly similar across the year cohorts, suggesting that there was no trend in 
profit margin gains over time. 
Some of the companies that did very well in their first post-buyout year, such as 
Best Products and Insilco, eventually ended up in bankruptcy, while others that started 
out poorly, such as Arkansas Best and Horace Mann Educators, never experienced 
financial distress and successfully completed IPOs. An obvious explanation for this result 
is that LBOs that filed for bankruptcy did not become as profitable as the LBO sponsors 
had envisioned when they determined the offer price for the target and the new capital 
structure. In contrast, firms that did poorly in their first year may have had ample 
buffers for bad years built into the LBO plans. 
3.2. Impact of LBOs on research and development 
Critics of leveraged buyouts argue that they cause firms to focus on short-term 
performance and ignore valuable long-term investments in research and development. 
Past studies (e.g. those of Kaplan and. Smith) have found that few LBO firms engage in 
significant R&D spending. Similarly, most firms in this study do not report R&D 
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expenses because it is negligible relative to sales. Of the 47 firms examined in this study, 
only nine reported any R&D expenses at all. Among these firms, R&D expenditures fell 
by a total of $30 million from one year before until one year after the buyout. This 
decline is small, but .because buyout targets have such low R&D to begin with, it is large 
in percentage terms. The median ratio of R&D expense to sales of the nine firms with 
any R&D spending fell by 20.5 percent - a statistically insignificant amount given the 
sample size. 
4. The financial health of the late-1980s LBOs 
4.1. Outcomes as a measure of transaction success 
While most of the LBOs in our sample experienced improved profit margins, the success 
of an LBO must also be measured in terms of how well the firm compared to the 
expectations of the LBO investors. The pattern of improving operating earnings shown 
above indicates that late 1980s LBO targets did offer gains from going public and that the 
sponsors has sufficient knowledge, on balance, to tap hidden profits. This evidence says 
little, however, about whether later stage LBOs were overpriced or whether less 
experienced LBO investors were able to design the appropriate capital structure for their 
acquisitions. From the equity investors' point of view, an LBO is only successful when 
profit margins are sufficient to pay off the bondholders and offer a reasonable return on 
the equity investment. 
There are essentially three paths that an LBO can follow upon going private: 1) 
the company can remain private and continue to service its debt; 2) the investors can 
cash out or increase the liquidity of their equity stake through an initial public offering 
or sale to another investor; or 3) the debt will overwhelm the cash flow of the firm, 
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leading to default and possibly bankruptcy. Because of the scarcity of data on the value 
of the equity investments in LBOs, little is revealed about the relative value of an LBO 
that follows the first path. LBOs that take the two last paths, however, provide more 
information about "Yhether the LBO met the sponsors' goals. In the case of default, the 
equity is usually worthless and bondholders become the new owners of the firm. Thus, 
default and bankruptcy are clear indicators that an LBO failed to meet expectations. 
Initial public offerings, likewise, are a clear signal of positive returns to the equity holders 
in the LBO. An LBO investor will only pursue an IPO if the expected price of the shares 
in the public stock market is high enough to realize a strong gain. Otherwise, the LBO 
investor will refrain from attempting an IPO until the return becomes more attractive. 
In this section, we document the number of firms in the sample that encountered 
financial distress and the number that were able to return to public status. These two 
indicators are measures of the success of the LBOs in the eyes of the equity investors in 
the LBOs. 
4.2. Financial Distress 
While we know the number of distressed firms is greater than in the early 1980s (there 
were almost no large LBOs that defaulted before 1987), just how common was the 
incidence of default? Table 3 lists the firms that encountered financial distress after going 
private and those that did not. We define financial distress as default on a bond or 
bankruptcy. Just under 28 percent of the sample experienced financial distress, a large 
fraction by historical standards but not so large as to seriously question the ex ante 
profitability of the late 1980s LBOs. 
All but one of the financially distressed firms encountered problems after the 
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economy slowed in 1989. The fact that highly leveraged firms in the late 1980s defaulted 
more frequently than their counterparts earlier in the decade may reflect the fact that the 
later cohort was more exposed to the business cycle and more prone to misforecasting 
future revenue streams. 
4.3. Tapping the !PO market 
The initial public offerings market has been particularly active since the Spring of 1991, 
making for an environment in which investors have been quite receptive to reverse LBOs. 
Table 4 shows that many firms which went private in the 1987-90 period have since 
returned to public ownership. Indeed, 28 of the 47 firms are now public again, of which 
19 completed initial public offerings. The remaining 9 firms were either acquired by 
public companies (5) or issued stock to their bondholders after emerging from 
bankruptcy (4). 
This experience compares favorably to that of earlier LBOs reported by Kaplan 
(1991). Both the firms in Kaplan's sample and our sample encountered a receptive IPO 
market within a few years of going private (Kaplan's LBOs experienced hot IPO markets 
in 1983 and 1986-1987). In Kaplan's sample, 38 percent of firms undertaking LBOs 
betWeen 1979 and 1986 had gone public (or were purchased by public companies) by 
1991. In contrast, fully 60 percent of the LBOs in our sample return to public status by 
mid-1993. The firms in our sample were more likely to return to public ownership than 
those in Kaplan's sample, despite a shorter average timespan since going private. 
Another way to compare the two samples is to compare the hazard rate of 
returning to public ownership or the cumulative survival rate of remaining private. The 
hazard rate, shown in Table 5, is the number of firms (n) that return to public ownership 
8 
after x years of remaining private divided by the number of firms that could possibly 
have returned to public status that many years after the LBO (R). The latter concept, R, 
is also called the "risk set" and in this sample includes all the LBOs that have existed long 
enough to be in the· set and have not yet gone public. For example, an LBO that was 
completed in 1990 and is still private is not in the risk set for year 5 because 5 years have 
not elapsed since the LBO. The cumulative survival rate is the percentage of firms that 
are still private x years after the LBO. 
Table 5 shows that most of the firms in the sample went public - the cumulative 
survival rate is only 27 percent by year 6. The table also indicates that they returned to 
public ownership rather quickly - the hazard rate, n/R, is close to 20 percent in years 
2 through 4. Kaplan (1991) presents similar data on the hazard rates and cumulative 
survival rates for earlier LBOs. The hazard rate for Kaplan's sample never rises above 
14 percent in any given year. Four years from the date of the LBO, 62 percent of the 
Kaplan sample is still private, whereas only 49 percent of our sample is still private. 
Within 6 years of going private over 70 percent of the late 1980s LBOs have returned to 
public ownership, while less than half of Kaplan's earlier LBOs had done so within 6 
years. 
Interestingly, several firms which encountered financial distress also eventually 
went public or were purchased by third parties (e.g. Charter Medical, Edgcomb, Revco 
and Southland). This experience is consistent with the view that financial distress, while 
costly, need not permantly damage firms' business prospects. Consider, for example, the 
case of Charter Medical, an operator of psychiatric and general hospitals, was taken 
private in a $1.6 billion management-led buyout in September 1988. 
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4.4 Bankruptcy need not be fatal: The case of Charter Medical 
Over the five years prior to its 1988 LBO, Charter Medical's net psychiatric 
revenues grew at an annual compound rate of 36 percent. With expectations of further 
strong growth in its. industry, Charter Medical continued to build psychiatric hospitals 
after the buyout, expanding its stock from 68 in 1988 to 89 by 1991. A severe decline in 
Medicare expenditures on mental health and substance abuse programs, however, 
combined with increasing corporate efforts to trim escalating health insurance premia, 
led to a 10 percent drop in occupancy rates and shorter average stays in its psychiatric 
hospitals in 1990. Consequently, EBITDA fell from over $280 million in 1989 to only $113 
million in 1990. In February 1991, the company defaulted on its debt obligations and 
began asset sales to maintain liquidity. Charter Medical filed a prepackaged bankruptcy 
plan in June 1992, which was confirmed a month later. Since then, EBITDA has 
rebounded to $280 million (annualized), despite a reduction in the number of psychiatric 
hospitals. While the LBO clearly fell short of the mark, profit margins have increased 
sharply since the buyout and the market value of Charter Medical today is fairly close 
to the price paid for the company in 1988, despite an industry-wide decline in demand. 
Thus, even this LBO that ended up in bankruptcy appears not have been a complete 
failure. 
5. Did LBOs destabilize the financial system? 
Many observers have expressed concern that the high levels of debt incurred in the LBOs 
of the late 1980s could cause a series of defaults that would seriously undermine the 
stability of the financial system (Bemanke, Campbell and Whited (1989), Friedman (1989), 
Greenspan (1991) and Reich (1989)). These worries prompted regulators to require banks 
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to separately classify loans made in leveraged buyouts as highly leveraged transaction 
(HLT) loans. The recession of 1990-1991 has now tested concerns about the destabilizing 
effects of leveraged buyouts. Contrary to well-publicized predictions, problems in major 
bank's HLT portfoli<?S have not prompted financial instability. One of the reasons for this 
experience becomes clear in Table 6. The table summarizes the HLT loan exposure of the 
largest U.S. banks as of December 31, 1991 (the last year in which HLT exposure was 
required). Many major banks such as Citicorp and Chemical carried large dollar amounts 
of HLT loans ($3.7 and $5.5 billion, respectively). But, on average, the major banks had 
only 3.11% of their assets in HLT loans. Banks list the amount of loans with some 
delayed payments as non-performing. The average major bank listed 10.59% of its HLT 
loans as non-performing at the end of 1991. Clearly, most of the money lent by banks 
in LBOs has been repaid on schedule. Many non-performing loans continued to be 
partly paid off or rescheduled. Thus, relatively few HLT loans have been charged off.4 
The average amount of HLT debt charged off in 1991 was fairly low-slightly over three 
percent. Contrary to fears expressed by some, this indicates that the banking system did 
not suffer greatly from lending in leveraged buyouts. Given the high fees and interest 
charged in many LBO loans, it appears that many banks may have made profits on their 
HLT portfolios.5 
4Many major banks have Charge-Off Committees to determine when to undertake 
charge-offs. Typically charge-offs are taken when a loan has a probability of repayment 
less than 50% or when it is sold at a discount to another investor. 
5While banks typically do not disdose the profitability of their loan positions several 
institutions reported making a profit on their HLT portfolios (e.g. Security Pacific, PNC 
and Mellon Bank Corp) in 1991 annual reports. This experience is consistent with 
banker's reluctance to view their HLT portfolios as major problem areas (Bleakley (1991)). 
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6. Impact of the 1990-91 recession on LBOs 
Finns with high leverage are especially vulnerable to economic downturns because of the 
possible adverse consequences of financial distress. Existing studies suggest that financial 
distress can be very costly for some firms (Altman (1983), Lang and Stulz (1992) and 
Opler and Titman (1993)). Some suggest that LBO firms will have problems with 
stakeholders such as employers and customers when financial troubles mount (Fox and 
Marcus (1992)). These possible costs of financial distress may mean that firms which 
have the misfortune of undertaking an LBO shortly before a recession will perform 
particularly poorly.6 This argument can be tested by comparing the performance of LBOs 
completed in 1989 with earlier LBOs in the sample. Firms that went private in 1989 bore 
the brunt of the recession in their second LBO outyear (1991 ). The median growth in the 
operating margin of the 12 firms in the 1989 cohort was 4.4 percent (year -1 to year +2). 
The growth rate for the 29 firms that went private in 1987 or 1988 was essentially the 
same - 4.2 percent. This suggests that last recession did not exact a heavy toll on 
operating performance as was feared. 
7. Conclusion 
This study investigates the performance of 47large LBOs that were completed at the end 
of the 1980s. We find that these LBOs were not devastated in the 1990-91 recession and 
that banks d id not experience large losses in the recession due to HLT lending. In fact, 
cash flow increased by 9.8 percent after adjustment for industry trends in the average 
6Jensen (1989) has argued that financial methods used to finance LBOs such as LBO 
sponsors and strip financing may reduce the costs of financial distress in these 
transactions. 
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LBO in our sample. All told, the LBOs examined in this study were followed by increases 
in operating cash flow of approximately $800 million, suggesting that these transactions 
yielded significant efficiency gains for investors. The strong operating improvements at 
firms taken private l;:lter in the 1980s is evidence against two theories of the ''bad cohort" 
- the idea that all the good targets were already taken private and the theory that later 
participants in the buyout market were lacking the expertise of LBO pioneers. It does 
appear, however, that many later deals were overpriced relative to pre-LBO cash flows 
(Kaplan and Stein (1993)). 
This improvement in operating profits is comparable to that observed in samples 
of earlier LBOs. Kaplan (1990), for example, finds that operating cash flow to sales rises 
by 11.9 percent in the two years after 34 LBOs from the 1980-86 period. Similar rises in 
operating cash flow have been documented by Kitching (1989), Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990), Smith (1991) and Kaplan and Stein (1993). The improvement of 4.2 
percent in raw profitability observed in this study is somewhat lower than that observed 
in these earlier studies. However, the improvement observed after industry adjustment 
is comparable to previous findings. This suggests that the somewhat weaker 
performance observed after later LBOs reflects the slowdown in the economy. Overall, 
the results in this study suggest that later LBOs did not result in smaller efficiency gains. 
This pattern is not consistent with the argument that changes in the LBO market after 
1986 dried up the supply of profitable LBO opportunities. 
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Table 1 
Impact of LBOs completed in the 1987-1990 period on profit margins. The profit margin is 
income before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by sales. Changes are 
shown relative to the date of the leveraged buyout (year 0). 
Year -1 to Year +1 Year -1 to Year +2 
Median Change 7.3% 4.2% 
Median Industry-Adjusted Change 3.4% 9.8% 
Number of LBOs 47 41 
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Table 2 
Change in profit margin from one year prior until one year after LBO. The profit margin is income before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by sales. Adjusted growth in margin is the growth 
in margin less the median 3-digit industry growth in margin over the same period. 
Growth Adjusted 
Year of Sales 3-digit in profit growth in 
Firm LBO (millions) SIC Code margin margin 
Southland 1987 $8,348 541 -21% -34% 
Revco Drug Stores 1987 $2,490 591 -12% -21% 
Burlington Industries 1987 $2,043 220 -1% 12% 
Tracor 1987 NA 372 0% 13% 
Pay N Pak 1987 $498 521 3% 1% 
Borg Warner 1987 $2,340 738 18% 31% 
Owens-Illinois 1987 $3,647 322 30% -26% 
International Controls 1987 $693 371 275% 281% 
Joy Technologies 1987 $553 353 6041% 5962% 
DynCorp 1988 $717 874 -64% -81% 
TWA 1988 $4,606 451 -50% -42% 
Stop & Shop 1988 $4,990 541 -23% -30% 
Tops Markets 1988 $1,150 541 -7% -14% 
Arkansas Best 1988 $849 421 -5% -2% 
Food maker 1988 $1,119 581 -5% -2% 
Essex Group 1988 $992 335 -1% -23% 
Fort Howard Co 1988 $1,151 262 2% -5% 
Harvard Industries 1988 $758 323 2% 14% 
American Standard 1988 $3,637 343 7% -1% 
AFG Industries 1988 $584 321 10% -1% 
Payless Cashways 1988 $2,226 521 14% 36% 
Bell & Howell 1988 $612 357 18% 41% 
Charter Medical 1988 $1,285 806 19% 3% 
Supermarkets General 1988 $6,298 541 20% 12% 
Musicland Stores 1988 $836 573 27% 32% 
Hillsborough Holdings 1988 $1,226 308 32% 41% 
Florida Steel 1988 $534 331 34% 29% 
Insilco Corp 1988 $767 358 43% 59% 
IBC Holdings 1988 $1,093 519 44% 67% 
Farm Fresh 1988 $735 541 46% 39% 
York Holdings 1988 $1,449 358 72% 88% 
Best Products 1988 $2,095 539 188% 210% 
Edgcomb 1989 $270 505 -129% -108% 
NWA 1989 $3,430 451 -107% -16% 
Alco Health Services 1989 $2,564 512 -28% -15% 
Silgan Holdings 1989 $658 341 -23% -21% 
Horace Mann Educators 1989 $629 633 -14% -56% 
Mayfair Supermarket 1989 $506 541 -2% 0% 
Hospital Corp of America 1989 $4,631 806 3% 9% 
RJR/Nabisco 1989 $13,879 211 26% 22% 
Chicago & Northwestern 1989 $961 401 43% 45% 
Super Rite Foods 1989 $415 514 45% 4% 
Cullum Cos 1989 $1,100 541 50% 53% 
Envirodyne Industries 1989 $516 308 58% 57% 
Kash n' Karry 1989 $1,039 541 79% 81% 
Gulfstream Aerospace 1990 $824 372 -48% -47% 
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Table 3 
Financial viability of leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990 in June 1993. Year 
of buyout shown in parentheses. 
No Financial Distress Experienced 
Borg Warner (1987) 
Burlington Industries (1987) 
International Controls (1987) 
Joy Technologies (1987) 
Owens-lllinois (1987) 
AFG Industries (1988) 
American Standard (1988) 
Arkansas Best (1988) 
Bell & Howell (1988) 
DynCorp (1988) 
Essex Group (1988) 
Farm Fresh (1988) 
Foodmaker (1988) 
Fort Howard Corp (1988) 
IBC Holdings (1988) 
Musicland Stores (1988) 
Payless Cashways (1988) 
Stop & Shop (1988) 
Supermarkets General (1988) 
Tops Markets (1988) 
York Holdings (1988) 
Alco Health Services (1989) 
Chicago & Northwestern (1989) 
Cullum Cos (1989) 
Horace Mann Educators (1989) 
Hospital Corp of America (1989) 
Kash n' Karry Food (1989) 
Mayfair Supermarkets (1989) 
NWA (1989) 
RJR/Nabisco (1989) 
Silgan Holdings (1989) 
Super Rite Foods (1989) 
General Instrument (1990) 
Gulfstream Aerospace (1990) 
Total Firms: 34 
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Financial Distress Experienced 
Chapter 11 
Pay N Pak (1987) 
Revco Drug Stores (1987) 
Southland (1987) 
Tracor (1987) 
Best Products (1988) 
Charter Medical (1988) 
Harvard Industries (1988) 





Florida Steel (1988) 
Edgcomb (1989) 
Total Firms: 13 
Table 4 
Status of leveraged buyouts completed between 1987 and 1990 in June 1993. Year of 
transaction initiation is shown in parentheses. 
Private equity only in 1993 
International Controls (1987) 
Pay N' Pak (1987) 
American Standard (1988) 
Bell & Howell (1988) 
Best Products (1988) 
DynCorp (1988) 
Essex Group (1988) 
Farm Fresh (1988) 
Fort Howard Corp. (1988) 
Harvard Industries (1988) 
Hillsborough Holdings (1988) 
Insilco (1988) 
Supermarkets General (1987) 
TWA (1988) 
Alco Health Services (1989) 
Envirodyne (1989) 
Kash N' Karry Foods (1989) 
NWA (1989) 
Silgan Holdings (1989) 
Total Firms: 19 
• Firm issued equity after filing for bankruptcy. 
Public equity by 1993 
Borg Warner (1987) 
Burlington Industries (1987) 
Joy Technologies (1987) 
Owens-lllinois (1987) 
Revco Drug Stores (1987)• 
Southland (1987)-.b 
Tracor (1987)• 
AFG Industries (1988) 
Arkansas Best (1988) 
Charter Medical (1988)8 
Florida Steel (1988)h 
Foodmaker (1988) 
IBC Holdings (1988) 
Musicland Stores (1988) 
Payless Cashways (1988) 
Stop & Shop (1988) 
Tops Markets (1988) 
York Holdings (1988) 
Chicago & Northwestern (1989) 
Cullum Cos (1989)b 
Edgcomb (1989)b 
Horace Mann Educators (1989) 
Hospital Corp. of America (1989) 
Mayfair Supermarkets (1989) 
RJR/Nabisco (1989) 
Super Rite Foods (1989) 
General Instruments (1990) 
Gulfstream Aerospace (1990) 
Total Firms: 28 




Rates at which LBOs returned to public ownership between one and six years after transaction 
initiation .. Censored firms are buyouts that are still private x years after the buyout and for 
which data on year x + 1 are unavailable (e.g., 1988 buyouts become censored in year 6- 1994). 
Number 'of Number of 
LBOs Private LBOs that 
at beginning of went public Censored Cumulative 
Year x year x in year x firms survival rate Hazard rate 
1 47 1 0 97.9 2.1 
2 46 9 0 78.7 19.6 
3 37 7 0 63.8 18.9 
4 30 7 5 48.9 23.3 
5 18 3 12 40.8 16.7 
6 3 1 2 27.2 33.3 
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Table 6 
Highly leveraged transaction (HLT) loan exposure and performance among large U.S. 
financial institutions as of December 31, 1991. 
Assets HLTs Non performing Charge-offs HLT 
Bank 1991 1991 Fraction Fraction Exposure 
Citicorp 216,922 3,700 25.19% 3.70% 1.71% 
Chemical Banking 138,930 5,500 13.38% 4.24% 3.96% 
BankAmerica 115,509 1,795 19.00% 1.17% 1.55% 
Nationsbank Corp 110,319 3,200 5.66% 1.25% 2.90% 
JP Morgan 103,468 1,390 2.88% NA 1.34% 
Chase Manhattan 98,197 3,193 6.30% 2.07% 3.25% 
Security Pacific 76,411 3,300 11.94% 3.08% 4.32% 
Bankers Trust 63,959 2,300 26.04% 3.00% 3.60% 
Wells Fargo 53,547 2,300 10.09% 5.57% 4.30% 
First Chicago 48,963 2,700 3.67% 2.85% 5.51% 
First Interstate Bancorp 48,922 433 11.32% 5.64% 0.89% 
Bane One 46,293 407 3.93% 0.47% 0.88% 
First Union Corp 46,085 1,169 9.58% 1.28% 2.54% 
Fleet Norstar 45,445 638 7.21% 0.11% 1.40% 
PNC Financial 44,892 1,672 4.90% 2.96% 3.72% 
Norwest Corp 40,293 125 8.80% 0.00% 0.31% 
Bank of New York 39,426 3,240 5.40% 5.37% 8.22% 
Sun trust 32,797 363 0.00% 0.00% 1.11% 
Barnett Banks 32,721 100 32.00% 14.00% 0.31% 
Bank of Boston Corp 32,700 2,600 5.96% 1.92% 7.95% 
First Fidelity Bancorp 30,215 381 10.47% 6.46% 1.26% 
NBD Bancorp 29,513 247 23.08% 2.39% 0.84% 
Mellon Bank Corp 29,355 1,405 1.99% 1.42% 4.79% 
Continental Bank 24,008 1,682 12.78% 5.29% 7.01% 
Average 66,892 2,027 10.59% 3.08% 3.11% 
19 
REFERENCES 
Altman, Edward, 1983, A further investigation of the bankruptcy cost question, Journal of Finance 
39, 1067-1089. 
Bernanke, Ben, John Y. Campbell, and Toni M. Whited, 1989, U.S. corporate leverage: 
developments in 1987 and 1988, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 255-278. 
Bleakley, Fred D., 1991, Big banks may be hit by significant losses from buy-out loans, Wall Street 
Journal, January 4, A1, AS. 
Fox, Isaac and Alfred Marcus, 1992, The causes and consequences of leveraged managed 
buyouts, Academy of Management Review 17, 62-85. 
Friedman, Benjamin, 1989, Tread carefully on takeovers, New York Journal of Commerce, April,27. 
Fridson, Martin, 1991, Agency costs: A key to spotting tomorrow's troubled deals, High Yield Quarterly, June, Merrill Lynch, New York, NY. 
Greenspan, Alan, 1989, Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee Hearings on LBOs and 
Corporate Debt, Reprinted in the journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Spring 1989, 31-34. 
Jensen, Michael, 1989, The eclipse of the public corporation, Harvard Business Review, September-
October, 61-75. 
Kaplan, Steven N., 1990, The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and 
value, journal of Financial Economics 24, 217-254. 
Kaplan, Steven N., 1991, The staying power of leveraged buyouts, journal of Financial Economics 
29, 287-313. 
. 
Kaplan, Steven N. and Jeremy C. Stein, 1993, The evolution of buyout pricing and financial 
structure in the 1980s, Quarterly journal of Economics, 313-357. 
Lang, Larry H. P. and Rene M. Stulz, 1992, Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of 
bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, journal of Financial Economics 32, 45-60. 
Long, William F. and David J. Ravenscraft, 1993, Decade of debt: Lessons from LBOs in the 
1980s, in Margaret M. Blair (ed.), The Deal Decade, Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 
Muscarella, Chris and Michel Vetsuypens, 1990, Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study 
of Reverse LBOs, journal of Finance 45, 1389-1414. 
Opler, Tim C., 1992, Operating performance in leveraged buyouts: Evidence from 1985-89, 
Financial Management 21, 27-34. 
Opler, Tim C. and Sheridan Titman, 1993, The indirect costs of financial distress, Manuscript, 
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX. 
20 
Reich, Robert, 1989, America pays the price, New York Times Magazine, January 29, 32-40. 
Smith, Abbie, 1991, Capital ownership structure and performance: The case of management 
buyouts, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 143-165. 
21 
Note: The following is a partial list of papers that are 
currently available in the Edwin L. Cox School of 
Business Working Paper Series. When requesting a 
paper, please include the Working Paper number as 
well as the title and author(s), and enclose pay-
ment of $2.50 per copy made payable to SMU. A 
complete list is available upon request from: 
Business Information Center 
Edwin L. Cox School of Business 
Southern Methodist University 















"Organizational Subcultures in a Soft Bureaucracy: 
Resistance Behind the Myth and Facade of an 
Official Culture," by John M. Jermier, John W. 
Slocum, Jr., Louis W. Fry, and Jeannie Gaines 
"Global Strategy and Reward Systems: The Key 
Roles of Management Development and Corporate 
Culture," by David Lei, John W. Slocum, Jr., and 
Robert W. Slater 
"Multiple Niche Competition - The Strategic Use of 
CIM Technology," by David Lei and Joel D. Goldhar 
"Global Strategic Alliances," by.David Lei and 
John W. Slocum, Jr. 
"A Theoretical Model of Household Coupon Usage 
Behavior And Empirical Test," by Ambuj Jain and 
Arun K. Jain 
"Household's Coupon Usage Behavior: Influence 
of In-Store Search," by Arun K. Jain and Ambuj 
Jain 
"Organization Designs for Global Strategic Alli-
ances," by John W. Slocum, Jr. and David Lei 
"Option-like Properties of Organizational Claims: 
Tracing the Process of Multinational Exploration, 
by Dileep Hurry 
"A Review of the Use and Effects of Comparative 
Advertising," by Thomas E. Barry 
"Global Expansion and the Acquisition Option: The 
Process of Japanese Takeover Strqtegy in the 
United States," by Dileep Hurry 
"Designing Global Strategic Alliances: Inte-
gration of Cultural and Economic Factors," by 
John W. Slocum, Jr. and David Lei 
"The Components of the Change in Reserve Value: 
New Evidence on SFAS No. 69," by Mimi L. Alciatore 
"Asset Returns, Volatility and the Output Side," 
by G. Sharathchandra 
"Pursuing Product Modifications and New Products: 
The Role of Organizational Control Mechanisms in 
Implementing Innovational Strategies in the 
















"Management Practices in Learning Organizations," 
by Michael McGill, John W. Slocum, Jr., and David 
Lei 
"The Determinants of LBO Activity: Free Cash 
Flow Vs. Financial Distress Costs," by Tim Opler 
"A Model of Supplier Responses to Just-In-Time 
Delivery Requirements," by John R. Grout and 
David P. Christy 
"An Inventory Model of Incentives for On-Time 
Delivery in Just-In-Time Purchasing Contracts," 
by John R. Grout and David P. Christy 
"The Effect of Early Resolution of Uncertainty on 
Asset Prices: A Dichotomy into Market and Non-
Market Information," by G. Sharathchandra and Rex 
Thompson 
"Conditional Tests of a Signalling Hypothesis: 
The Case of Fixed Versus Adjustable Rate Debt," 
by Jose Guedes and Rex Thompson 
"Tax-Loss-Selling and Closed-End Stock Funds," by 
John W. Peavy III 
"Hostile Takeovers and Intangible Resources: An 
Empirical Investigation," by Tim C. Opler 
"Morality and Models," by Richard 0. Mason 
"Global Outsourcing of Information Processing 
Services," by Uday M. Apte and Richard 0. Mason 
"Improving Claims Operations: A Model-Based 
Approach," by Uday M. Apte, Richard A. Cavaliere, 
and G. G. Hegde 
"Corporate Restructuring and The Consolidation of 
U.S. Industry," by Julia Liebeskind, Timothy C. 
Opler, and Donald E. Hatfield 
"Catalog Forecasting System: A Graphics-Based 
Decision Support System," by David V. Evans and 
Uday M. Apte 
"Interest Rate Swaps: A Bargaining Game 
Solution," by Uday Apte and Prafulla G. Nabar 
"The Causes o f Corporate Refocusing," by Julia 














"Job Performance and Attitudes of Disengagement 
Stage Salespeople Who Are About to Retire," by 
William L. Cron, Ellen F. Jackofsky, and John W. 
Slocum, Jr. 
"Global Strategy, Alliances and Initiative," by 
David Lei and John W. Slocum, Jr. 
"What's Wrong with the Treadway Commission 
Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects 
of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting," by Arthur P. 
Brief, Janet M. Dukerich, Paul R. Brown and 
Joan F. Brett 
"Testing Whether Predatory Commit:ments are 
Credible," by John R. Lott, Jr. and Tim C. 
Opler 
"Dow Corning and the Silicone Implant Contro-
versy," by Zarina S. F. Lam and Dileep Hurry 
"The Strategic Value of Leverage: An Explora-
tory Study," by Jose C. Guedes and Tim C. Opler 
"Decision Model for Planning of Regional 
Industrial Programs," by Uday M. Apte 
"Understanding the Linkage between Strategic 
Planning and Firm Performance: A Synthesis of 
more than Two Decades of Research," by C. Chet 
Miller and Laura B. Cardinal 
"Global Disaggregation of Information-Intensive 
Services," by Uday M. Apte and Richard 0. Mason 
"Cost and Cycle Time Reduction in Service 
Industry: A Field Study of Insurance Claims 
Operation," by Uday M. Apte and G. G. Hegde 
"A Robust, Exact Alborithrn for the Maximal Set 
Covering Problem," by BrianT. Downs and Jeffrey 
D. Camm 
"The Economic Dependency of Work: Testing the 
Moderating Effects of Financial Requirements on 
the Relationship between Organizational Commitment 
and Work Attitudes and Behavior," by Joan F. 
Brett, William L. Cron, and John W. Slocum, Jr. 
"Unlearning the Organization," by Michael McGill 








93 - 0915 
"The- Determinants of Corporate Bank Borrowing, " 
by Linda Hooks and Tim C. Opler 
"Corporate Diversification and Innovative Effi-
ciency: An Empirical Study," by Laura B. 
Cardinal and Tim C. Opler 
"The Indirect Costs of Financial Distress," by 
Tim C. Opler and Sheridan Titman 
"A Mathematical Programming Method for Generating 
Alternative Managerial Performance Goals After 
Data Envelopment Analysis," by Jeffrey D. Camm and 
Brian T. Downs 
"Empirical Methods in Corporate Finance used to 
Conduct Event Studies," by Rex Thompson 
"A Simple Method to Adjust Exponential Smoothing 
Forecasts for Trend and Seasonality," by Marion G. 
Sobol and Jim Collins 
"QuaJ..ity Management at Kentucky Fri2d Chicken," 
by Uday M. Apte and Charles C. Reynolds 
"Global Disaggregation of Information-Intensive 
Services," by Uday M. Apte and Richard 0. Mason 
